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INTRODUCTION 
The law relating to abortion in Scotland, England and Wales is ostensibly governed by 
a single Act: the Abortion Act 1967.2 This legislation was created to remove the dangers 
of the “back-alley abortionist with her knitting needles”3 – as it has broadly succeeding 
in doing so,4 most commentators regard the Act as a success.5 
With that said, the 1967 Act has been described as a “curious”6 piece of 
legislation due to the fact that it does not grant any rights to women that seek to 
terminate pregnancy. Instead, it simply confers a privilege upon doctors who carry out 
abortion procedures.7 In addition, though many think otherwise,8 the 1967 Act neither 
confirmed nor created a uniform legal approach towards abortion in the United 
Kingdom. Prior to 1967 abortion was a wholly common law matter in Scotland9 and 
there were recognised, if nebulous,10 defences to the crime. Conversely, in England, the 
issue of abortion – its status as a social and criminal concern – has been determined by 
statute since 1861, with the passing of the Offences against the Person Act.11 
Due to these fundamental differences in legal governance, the wording of the 
Act and the Act’s reliance on English statute, the Scottish legal position remains 
                                                 
2 c.87 – henceforth referred to as ‘the 1967 Act’. The Act does not extend to Northern Ireland: See s.7 
3 See Davis, The Legalisation of Therapeutic Abortion, [1968] S.L.T 205 
4 Davis, The Legalisation of Therapeutic Abortion, [1968] S.L.T 205, though there are, of course, some 
unfortunate exceptions; see R v Catt [2013] EWCA Crim 1187  
5 G. Davis and R. Davidson, “A Fifth Freedom” or “Hideous Atheistic Expediency”? The Medical Community 
and Abortion Law Reform in Scotland, c.1960-1975, [2006] Medical History 50: 29-48 
6 G Gordon, Criminal Law, (3rd Edition, SULI, 2001) Volume II Chapter 28, para.28.05 
7 G Gordon, Criminal Law, (3rd Edition, SULI, 2001) Volume II Chapter 28, para.28.05 
8 As exemplified by the incorrect assumption made by Kerry Petersen in chapter five of her book Abortion 
Regimes, in which she incorrectly states that the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 applies in Scotland, 
despite the fact that s.78 of the Act expressly states that it does not – see Petersen, Abortion Regimes, 
(Dartmouth: Medico-Legal Series, 1993)  
9 See K. Norrie, Family Planning Practice and the Law, (Dartmouth: Medico-Legal Series, 1991) Chapter 3 
p.30 
10 See – G Gordon, Criminal Law, (3rd Edition, SULI, 2001) Volume II Chapter 28, para.28.01 
11 c.100 
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entirely distinct from that of England and Wales at present.12 The fact that the Act 
wholly ignores the previous Scottish position means that the law may be interpreted 
very differently in Scotland than in England13 and, prima facie, it appears that two of 
the best known hallmarks of the 1967 Act – the 24 week term limit (introduced by 
amendments made by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990) and the two-
physician requirement – may be subverted by applying the still-operational Scottish 
common law. 
The purpose of this paper is to critically examine the Scottish legal position 
prior to the passage of the 1967 Act, ascertain exactly what changes, if any, have been 
effected by the legislation and evaluate the level of awareness that Scottish physicians, 
and members of the public, held regarding the unique Scottish law prior to, and post, 
1967. The question of whether or not legislation was required, or the common law 
position simply required better publicity, is posed and answered; as is the question of 
whether or not Westminster has, in this instance, legislated for Scotland with an overly 
Anglo-centric view. 
In order to achieve these listed objectives, a full study of the historic, pre-1967 
common law has been undertaken alongside a comprehensive analysis of contemporary 
case law. A number of reported and unreported cases are given detailed consideration, 
the practices of the Aberdonian physician Sir Dugald Baird and his Glaswegian 
counterpart, Doctor Ian Donald are noted and the impact that the attitudes of these 
eminent physicians had on historic public opinion towards abortion in Scotland is 
evaluated.    
Ultimately, this paper concludes by reiterating the substantive argument that the 
                                                 
12 K. Norrie, Abortion in Great Britain: One Act Two Laws, [1985] Crim. L.R 475 
13 See the Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, Volume VII, Criminal Law Reissue/9  Abortion and Concealment of 
Pregnancy, (updated 2014) para.281 
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1967 Act is a flawed piece of legislation which is more akin to a convention than a 
formal piece of law. 
THE LAW PRIOR TO 1967 
The first reported instance of abortion being charged as a crime in its own right, in 
Scotland, occurred in the case of John Fenton,14 though the earlier case of Patrick 
Robertson and Marion Kempt15 may have seen an instance of induced miscarriage tried 
as murder. In spite of the fact that abortion was a well-established crime known to Scots 
law, however, Sir Dugald Baird nevertheless claimed that abortion had “long been legal 
in Scotland” in a 1975 academic article.16 
 This statement was made as the result of his thirty years of practical experience 
as a gynaecologist,17 during the course of which he provided “social” abortions18 for a 
number of women. In 1963, 2% of women in Aberdeen were provided with lawful 
abortions by the National Health Service19 and, though the position in Glasgow was 
slightly more conservative, with only 1 woman in 3,750 receiving such treatment,20 
termination operations were nevertheless carried out by NHS professionals in that 
city.21 According to the Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia’s most recent updated reissue, 
“medically-indicated abortion was fairly readily available to a high proportion of 
                                                 
14 (1761) – Reported in Burnett’s A Treatise on the various branches of the Criminal law of Scotland, (1811) at 
p. 6 
15 (1627) Hume, I, 186 
16 See D. Baird, Induced Abortion: Epidemiological Aspects, [1975] Journal of Medical Ethics I, 122-126 
17 See D. Baird, Induced Abortion: Epidemiological Aspects, [1975] Journal of Medical Ethics I, 122-126 
18 See – G. Davis, The Great Divide: The Policy and Practice of Abortion in 1960’s Scotland, [2004] The 
Sibbald Library Archives 
19 Discussed in G. Davis, The Great Divide: The Policy and Practice of Abortion in 1960’s Scotland, [2004] The 
Sibbald Library Archives and in the Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, Volume VII, Criminal Law to Customs and 
Excise, (1995) para.283 
20 G. Davis and R. Davidson, “A Fifth Freedom” or “Hideous Atheistic Expediency”? The Medical Community 
and Abortion Law Reform in Scotland, c.1960-1975, [2006] Medical History 50: 29-48; p.37 
21 G. Davis and R. Davidson, “A Fifth Freedom” or “Hideous Atheistic Expediency”? The Medical Community 
and Abortion Law Reform in Scotland, c.1960-1975, [2006] Medical History 50: 29-48; p.37 
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Scottish women” even before the passage of the Act.22 
This state of affairs was not regarded as criminal because Scots law recognised 
the legitimacy of therapeutic termination. Abortion was treated, primarily, as a medical 
matter and the dearth of Scottish case law concerning abortion23 may be attributed to 
the fact that the legal profession was reluctant to interfere with decisions made by 
doctors.24 In the third edition of Angus’ Dictionary of Crimes and Offences, the authors 
note that ‘the causing of abortion by a medical practitioner acting in good faith would 
not be punishable.’25 The Crown Office would not bring a prosecution unless the 
provider clearly displayed “criminal intent”.26  
According to the common law, a Scottish medical practitioner could defend a 
charge of abortion by claiming that the procedure was a “necessary medical 
operation”27 and, on the rare occasion in which a complaint was lodged against a 
doctor, the case would be closed if the investigators were satisfied that the operating 
physician had carried out the termination in good faith, and in the proper manner.28 
Ultimately, a successful prosecution could only occur if “wicked and felonious”29 intent 
was proven. 
                                                 
22 Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, Volume VII, Criminal Law Reissue/9  Abortion and Concealment of 
Pregnancy, (updated 2014) para.280 
23 National Archives of Scotland (hereafter NAS), AD63/759/1, House of Commons question, 19 July 1966 
24 G. Bhatia, Social Obstetrics, Maternal Health Care Policies and Reproductive Rights: The Role of Dugald 
Baird in Great Britain, 1937-65, M.Phil. (University of Oxford, 1996), p. 59. 
25 C.A MacPherson and J. Mill, A Dictionary of Crimes and Offences According to the Law of Scotland, (3rd 
Edition) (W. Green and Son, 1936) 
26 C.A MacPherson and J. Mill, A Dictionary of Crimes and Offences According to the Law of Scotland, (3rd 
Edition) (W. Green and Son, 1936) 
27Though the defence to the charge was regarded as ‘ill defined’ in  Gordon’s Criminal Law, (3rd Edition) 
Volume II Chapter 28, para.28.01 it is certain that the defence was ‘well settled’ – K. Norrie, Abortion in Great 
Britain: One Act Two Laws, [1985] Crim. L.R 475, and Mason McCall Smith, Law and Medical Ethics, (9th 
Edition, Oxford University Press, 2013), chapter 9, para.9.57 
28 G. Davis and R. Davidson, “A Fifth Freedom” or “Hideous Atheistic Expediency”? The Medical Community 
and Abortion Law Reform in Scotland, c.1960-1975, [2006] Medical History 50: 29-48; p.31 
29 See H.M Advocate v Graham (1892) 2 Adam 412, 415 and the discussion in G. Davis and R. Davidson, “A 
Fifth Freedom” or “Hideous Atheistic Expediency”? The Medical Community and Abortion Law Reform in 
Scotland, c.1960-1975, [2006] Medical History 50: 29-48; p.31 
P a g e  | 6 
 
While Lady Smith stated, in the 2012 case of Doogan v Greater Glasgow and 
Clyde Health Board,30 that abortion was illegal in Scotland prior to the 1967 Act,31 even 
if the termination was provided by a registered medical professional,32 this statement 
can be shown to be incorrect by reference to earlier authority. In H.M.A v Graham,33 the 
Court accepted that abortion would not be criminal if carried out in a medical context 
and in the case of H.M.A v Ross,34 which remains the sole case in which a Scottish 
medical practitioner was prosecuted, the central issue was the fact that the termination 
occurred in the patient’s home; in the absence of professional medical guidance.35 
It is to be noted, further, that the prosecution of Doctor Ross in 1967 did not 
result in a conviction for criminal abortion, but rather a plea of guilty.36 The court, 
therefore, did not establish any precedent to affirm that Ross’s actions were criminal; 
rather, Ross merely unwisely, and perhaps erroneously, accepted criminal liability for 
his actions. Indeed, the primary argument adopted by the Crown Agent in that case was 
that an honest medical practitioner had nothing to fear from the law and that Doctor 
Ross would not have pleaded guilty had his actions not been on the borderline between 
criminal and therapeutic.37 
The case, even then, was regarded as “unique” by Counsel38 and it appears that, 
had the accused not intimated a guilty plea, the possibility of an acquittal on a point of 
law was distinctly present39 (though not certain). It is therefore submitted that had Ross 
                                                 
30 2012 S.L.T. 1041 
31 Doogan v Greater Glasgow and Clyde Health Board (2012) S.L.T. 1041Para. 42 
32 Doogan v Greater Glasgow and Clyde Health Board (2012) S.L.T. 1041Para. 42 
33 (1892) 2 Adam 412 
34 NAS, JC26/1967/117, High Court of Edinburgh trial papers, 24 Jan. 1967 
35 NAS, AD63/759/2, Note by Crown Agent, Feb. 1967 
36 NAS, AD63/759/2, Note by Crown Agent, Feb. 1967 
37 NAS, AD63/759/2, Note by Crown Agent, Feb. 1967 
38 Mr A. Bell – G. Davis and R. Davidson, “A Fifth Freedom” or “Hideous Atheistic Expediency”? The Medical 
Community and Abortion Law Reform in Scotland, c.1960-1975, [2006] Medical History 50: 29-48; p.31 
39 Counsel for the accused argued that the doctor was a respected medical practitioner who had provided the 
abortion after the two girls had come to him in a state of “complete agitation and desperation” - NAS, 
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pled his innocence40 the prosecution would have been difficult to maintain as a Scottish 
prosecutor had to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the doctor did not believe, for 
whatever reason, that the procedure was required.41  
Accordingly, it is submitted that the view expressed by Lady Smith, that ‘prior 
to the passing of the 1967 Act, if a doctor performed a surgical termination on a 
pregnant woman or administered abortifacient drugs to her, or instructed someone else 
to do so, he would have been guilty of an offence’,42 must be regarded as erroneous and 
that it was legally possible for a Scottish physician to carry out abortion prior to the 
passage of the 1967 Act. Indeed, the top prosecutors of the day in Scotland regarded the 
legislation as mechanically unnecessary;43 in 1978, then-Lord Advocate Ronald Murray 
claimed that the legislation was either unduly restrictive, or utterly ineffective.44  
For his part, Sir Dugald Baird was particularly frustrated that legislative 
intervention was regarded as necessary,45 stating: “One hears talk about modernising 
abortion laws. Certainly the law should be clarified and spelt out in words of one 
syllable. But the work has been done for 20 years, it has all been documented and I 
haven’t gone outside the law.”46 
While there is evidence to suggest that the law was known to at least some 
Scottish physicians prior to 1967,47 in spite of the fact that Glaister and Rentoul’s 
                                                                                                                                                        
HH41/1820, John Hobson, MP, to Bruce Millan, Scottish Office, 20 Feb. 1967. 
40 It is not known why Ross pled guilty – G. Davis and R. Davidson, “A Fifth Freedom” or “Hideous Atheistic 
Expediency”? The Medical Community and Abortion Law Reform in Scotland, c.1960-1975, [2006] Medical 
History 50: 29-48; p.31 
41 This suggests that the prosecution’s argument regarding the method utilised by Ross was not correct in law. In 
England, the method employed by the physician in R v Smith [1973] 1 W.L.R 1510 , was regarded as a relevant 
consideration, though the relevance of this case to Scotland may be doubted given general legal differences. 
42 Doogan v Greater Glasgow and Clyde Health Board (2012) S.L.T. 1041 para.42 
43 NAS, AD101/13, P Layden to Lord Advocate, 17 July 1978 
44 NAS, AD101/13, P Layden to Lord Advocate, 17 July 1978 
45 G. Davis and R. Davidson, “A Fifth Freedom” or “Hideous Atheistic Expediency”? The Medical Community 
and Abortion Law Reform in Scotland, c.1960-1975, [2006] Medical History 50: 29-48 p.35 
46 Quoted in the Observer, 30th January 1966 
47 Wellcome, SA/FPA/A17/129, ‘Aberdeen shows way on abortion’, Med. News, 18 July 1969 
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“medico-legal bible”48 failed to differentiate the law of Scotland and England regarding 
abortion, it is nevertheless clear that the permissibility of abortion under Scots law was 
not commonly known at the time.49 Indeed, given the fact that Kerry Petersen 
erroneously reported in her text, Abortion Regimes, that the Offences against the Person 
Act 1861 applies to Scotland,50 and the fact that Lady Smith incorrectly stated that 
physician sanctioned abortion was illegal in Scotland prior to 1967, it may be 
concluded that the pre-1967 permissibility of abortion is still not commonly known. 
Thus, though the pre-1967 law is far from clear, it is obvious that the crime of 
abortion in Scotland was a common law offence, rather than a breach of strict statutory 
regulation. Though abortion was a crime known to the law of Scotland, there were 
circumstances in which termination of pregnancy were not regarded as criminal. As 
physician-sanctioned abortion was permitted by the law, eminent legal practitioners and 
physicians regarded a mechanical change in the law as unnecessary; indeed, when the 
1967 Act was brought into force, at least one former Lord Advocate regarded it as 
either unduly restrictive or utterly ineffective. Indeed, one West coast doctor noted that 
“the Act might as well not have been passed as far as [his] patients [were] concerned” 
as the legislation did nothing to change medical practice.51 
Accordingly, this paper shall presently examine the provisions of the 1967 Act 
in detail, in order to ascertain the contemporary legal position, and critically analyse 
exactly what the legal, if not practical, impact of the 1967 Act has been. 
THE LAW POST-1967 
                                                 
48 J Glaister and E Rentoul, Medical jurisprudence and toxicology, (12th ed, Edinburgh and London, E & S 
Livingstone, 1966), pp. 363–366 – termed as such by Davis and Davidson. 
49 Indeed, Sir Dugald only learned about the legal permissibility of abortion after discussion the issue with the 
Dean of Aberdeen University’s law faculty; see G. Bhatia, Social Obstetrics, Maternal Health Care Policies and 
Reproductive Rights: The Role of Dugald Baird in Great Britain, 1937-65, M.Phil. (University of Oxford, 1996) 
50 See K. Petersen, Abortion Regimes, (Dartmouth: Medico-Legal Series, 1993)  
51 G. Davis and R. Davidson, The Sexual State: Sexuality and Scottish Governance, 1950-1980, (Oxford 
University Press, 2012) Chapter 5 
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Section 1 of the 1967 Act, as amended by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 
1990,52 provides that medical termination of pregnancy is permissible where two 
doctors opine, in good faith, that it is necessary for one of four distinct reasons.53 
Section 5(2) of the Act explicitly states that anything which is done in order to procure 
a miscarriage is unlawful, unless authorised by s.1 of the Act. 
When considering the 1967 Act in a specifically Scottish context, one must 
consider the fact that the Act does not actually change the legal status of abortion in 
Scotland. The defences spelled out in ss.1 (a)-(d) are, essentially, a codification of the 
previous Scottish legal position54 and, as stated in the introduction, the legislation does 
not abrogate the crime of abortion. In the words of Professor Kenneth Norrie, the Act 
“exists parasitically (or perhaps symbiotically) on the previously existing law.”55  
The passage of the Act was “fundamentally underpinned” by the idea that 
family planning should be an area regulated by medical expertise.56 Indeed, several 
years after the passage of the Act the Scottish Home and Health Department (SHHD), 
when meeting with representatives of the Scottish General Services Committee, firmly 
stated that decisions regarding termination of pregnancy were to be made by medical 
professionals alone, and that “the department would not wish to interfere with the 
judgement of any doctor.”57 
This does not appear to be too different from the pre-1967 Scottish legal and 
practical position,58 in which medical professionals were able to carry out therapeutic 
                                                 
52 c.37 – henceforth, “The 1990 Act” 
53 See ss.1(a)-(d) 
54 K. Norrie, Family Planning Practice and the Law, (Dartmouth: Medico-Legal Series, 1991) p.30 
55 K. Norrie, Family Planning Practice and the Law, (Dartmouth: Medico-Legal Series, 1991) p.30 
56 For a discussion of Baird’s activity in relation to abortion, see G. Davis and R. Davidson, “A Fifth Freedom” 
or “Hideous Atheistic Expediency”? The Medical Community and Abortion Law Reform in Scotland, c.1960-
1975, [2006] Medical History 50: 29-48; p.37 
57 National Archives of Scotland, HH102/1232, Notes of the Meeting between SHHD and Representatives of the 
Scottish General Medical Services Committee, 24 Sept. 1974 
58 It has been stated that ‘[D]octors and women in Scotland enjoy the protection of the Abortion Act1967, but the 
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abortion for whatever was, in their view, “good and sufficient reason.”59 
With that said, the addition of the ‘two physician’ requirement (introduced by 
the 1967 Act), and the inclusion of a 24 week term limit in s.1 (1) (a) (introduced by the 
1990 Act), appear, prima facie, to be legitimate changes brought about by the 
legislation. While it was regarded as good medical practice to obtain a second signature 
prior to 196760 there was nothing in law that strictly forbade a single Scottish physician 
from performing or authorising abortion.61 Accordingly a better understanding of the 
term ‘unlawful’, as used in s.5 of the 1967 Act, is required.  
The provision made by s.5 (2) is not problematic in England and Wales due to 
the statutory regime which exists in this jurisdiction. While English law was liberalised, 
somewhat, by the case of R v Bourne,62 and the British Medical Association Committee 
had previously sought to interpret the relevant legislation as permissive in a therapeutic 
context,63 the governing pieces of legislation – the Offences Against the Person Act 
1861 and the Infant Life Preservation Act 192964 – make no distinction between 
criminal and therapeutic abortion.65 Accordingly, the word ‘unlawful’ can be read, and 
understood, plainly: the act of procuring miscarriage is illegal, and therefore criminal, 
unless authorised by s.1 of the Act. 
In Scotland, however, the situation is rather different and, unless the 1967 Act 
created a new statutory offence,66 the word ‘unlawful’ must be read in its full legal 
                                                                                                                                                        
statute has added little to the position at common law.’ – Meyers, The Human Body and the Law, (Second 
Edition, Stanford University Press, 1990), p.45  
59 Davis, The Legalisation of Therapeutic Abortion, [1968] S.L.T 205 
60 See Taylor, The Principles and Practice of Medical Jurisprudence, (5th Edition, J&A Churchill, London, 
1905) p.154 
61 Davis, The Legalisation of Therapeutic Abortion, [1968] S.L.T 205 
62 [1939] 1 KB 687 
63 K. Petersen, Abortion Regimes, (Dartmouth: Medico-Legal Series Publication, 1993) – p.56 
64 c.34 
65 See Mason McCall Smith, Law and Medical Ethics, (9th Edition, Oxford University Press, 2013), chapter 9, 
para.9.54 
66 Which is extremely unlikely – see K. Norrie, Abortion in Great Britain: One Act Two Laws, [1985] Crim. L.R 
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context: An unlawful action is not necessarily a criminal action. If one has a valid 
defence which excuses unlawful conduct, criminal liability does not attach.  
Section 1 of the Act provides that “a person shall not be guilty of an offence 
under the law relating to abortion when a pregnancy is terminated by a registered 
medical practitioner if two registered medical practitioners are of the opinion, formed in 
good faith [that]” one of the four nominate reasons apply to the woman’s situation.67 
Section 6 of the Act – the interpretation section – provides that ‘“the law 
relating to abortion” means sections 58 and 59 of the Offences against the Person Act 
1861 and any rule of law relating to the procurement of abortion”.68  
The 1861 Act does not apply in Scotland.69 The law relating to abortion 
therefore means, tautologically, the law relating to abortion. Accordingly, the 1967 Act 
provides that, in Scotland, a physician who has formed the opinion that a termination of 
pregnancy is required, and carries out an abortion for a legitimate reason (with a second 
opinion), will not be guilty of an offence according to a rule of law which already 
provides that these actions are permissible. As this provision clearly adds nothing to the 
law, and does not, of itself, prohibit any conduct,70 one may suggest that, as a result of 
the wording of s.5, s.1 of the 1967 Act, it is “strictly speaking possible in Scotland for a 
doctor to perform an abortion that would be legal under the existing common law, even 
if this was outside the terms of the Abortion Act 1967”.71 
With that said; Lord MacKay, Lord McEwan and Lady Dorian authoritatively 
stated, per curiam, that there remains no “residual ability at common law to carry out 
                                                                                                                                                        
475, at p. 481 
67 The 1967 Act, s.1 
68 The 1967 Act, s.6 
69 See s.78 of the 1861 Act. The 1929 Act does not extend to Scotland either – see s.3 (2) of the 1929 Act. 
70 It has been stated that ‘[D]octors and women in Scotland enjoy the protection of the Abortion Act1967, but the 
statute has added little to the position at common law.’ – Meyers, The Human Body and the Law, (Second 
Edition (1990) Stanford University Press, p.45  
71 Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, Volume VII, Criminal Law Reissue/9  Abortion and Concealment of 
Pregnancy, (updated 2014) para.281 
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an abortion where the circumstances may be such as existed in R v Bourne”.72 Though 
this opinion is merely obiter, it is supported by the per curiam judgement of the 
Supreme Court delivered by Lady Hale73 and it would nevertheless appear to suggest 
that a prosecution could occur if a single physician authorised a termination for a 
legitimate reason, or if one (or even two) physicians opined that a termination should 
occur after the expiry of the 24 week limit, in spite of the fact that the ‘law relating to 
abortion’ does not prohibit this.     
This suggestion may be challenged as the opinion of the Inner House fails to 
address a number of fundamental problems with the law as it stands and highlights the 
key issues inherent in the 1967 Act. The short statement of the court does not suggest 
under what grounds, or even how, criminal liability would be incurred by a physician 
that authorises termination in a manner permitted by the common law, but not expressly 
authorised by s.1 of the Act. As observed by Professor Norrie, in Scotland “there is a 
general presumption that the common law should not be altered by statute unless this is 
an explicit and inevitable result of the words used in the statute”.74 As Parliament 
clearly did not intend to create a new crime, or widen the existing scope of the old 
crime of abortion, it is submitted that, so long as a Scottish doctor acts within the 
common law, a prosecution cannot be brought under the auspices of the 1967 Act, even 
if they fail to adhere to the proscribed requirements of s.1.75 Parliament did not intend 
this Act to be used as a vehicle for prosecution.76  
Furthermore, it is submitted that there is no other method by which a Scottish 
doctor may be prosecuted. The common law did not forbid physician-sanctioned 
                                                 
72 Doogan v Greater Glasgow and Clyde Health Board [2013] S.L.T. 517, para.31 
73 Doogan v Greater Glasgow and Clyde Health Board [2014] UKSC 68, para.1 
74 see K. Norrie, Abortion in Great Britain: One Act Two Laws, [1985] Crim. L.R 475 p. 481 
75 Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, Volume VII, Criminal Law Reissue/9  Abortion and Concealment of 
Pregnancy, (updated 2014) para.281 
76 G. Davis and R. Davidson, “A Fifth Freedom” or “Hideous Atheistic Expediency”? The Medical Community 
and Abortion Law Reform in Scotland, c.1960-1975, [2006] Medical History 50: 29-48; p.31 
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abortion and no part of the common law was abrogated by the 1967 Act.77 The 
declaratory power of the High Court has been fallen out of favour as a result of the 
European Convention on Human Rights78 and, as such, it is commonly thought that the 
courts should no longer, without solid legal reason, retroactively alter the common 
law.79 
Thus, even if a prosecution can be brought under the 1967 Act, there exists no 
law that would allow for the indictment of a physician who unilaterally authorised a 
termination procedure for an otherwise permissible reason. While this submission 
clearly runs against the current of contemporary judicial thought, given the per curiam 
comments of the Inner House and the Supreme Court,80 to suggest that the 1967 Act has 
had a restrictive effect is to ignore the purpose of the legislation.81   
Of course, though that is the case, it is mechanically possible for the High Court 
to use the declaratory power to widen the scope of the crime of abortion.82 Though the 
declaratory power has been criticised by a number of practitioners and academics, it is 
nevertheless thought that, at present, the courts may make use of this mechanism to 
hold factual events to be unlawful, in spite of no explicit, prior prohibition.83 
Regardless of the present state of the declaratory power in Scotland, however, 
the per curiam statement of the Inner House in Doogan remains fallacious for a number 
of other reasons; the most noteworthy of which being the fact that R v Bourne was not a 
                                                 
77 G. Davis and R. Davidson, “A Fifth Freedom” or “Hideous Atheistic Expediency”? The Medical Community 
and Abortion Law Reform in Scotland, c.1960-1975, [2006] Medical History 50: 29-48; p.31 
78 See I. D. Willock, The Declaratory Power -- Still Indefensible, [1996] Jur Rev 97, at p 97. 
79 See A. Cadoppi, Nulla Poena Sine Lege and Scots Criminal Law: a Continental Perspective, [1998] Jur Rev 
73 
80 Doogan v Greater Glasgow and Clyde Health Board [2013] S.L.T. 517; Doogan v Greater Glasgow and 
Clyde Health Board [2014] UKSC 68 
81 Though such an interpretation is indeed possible; see NAS, AD63/759/2, Note by Crown Agent, Feb. 1967 
82 K. Norrie, Family Planning Practice and the Law, (Dartmouth: Medico-Legal Series, 1991) p.40 
83 See R. S. Shiels, The Declaratory Power And The Abolition Of The Syllogism, [2010] S.C.L. Jan, 1-13 
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Scottish case and its decision did not have any bearing on Scots law.84  
In addition to this, the post-1967 law clearly permits termination in 
circumstances akin to R v Bourne as s.1 (1) (b) of the 1967 Act is, essentially, a liberal 
codification of the Bourne ruling. This section provides that if two physicians opine (in 
good faith) that “the termination is necessary to prevent grave permanent injury to the 
physical or mental health of the pregnant woman” then the abortion is legally 
permissible. No term time limit is placed on this section. Though doing so may be poor 
medical practice,85 a termination on grounds of s.1 (1) (b) could legally occur the day 
before, or of, delivery. Therefore the only way in which a Scottish physician could 
carry out a termination in circumstances akin to that in Bourne in contravention of the 
1967 Act, would be if they proceeded without a second opinion.  
This application of the opinion is clearly far narrower than the Inner House 
intended in their obiter judgement; however this interpretation is nevertheless legally 
sound. Thus, it must be concluded that the Scottish law relating to abortion post-1967 
is, if nothing else, as unclear as it was before 1967. Though current judicial thought 
appears to favour a restrictive interpretation of the 1967 Act, and the judiciary 
technically has the power to enforce this through the use of the declaratory power of the 
High Court, this interpretation clearly goes against the intentions of Parliament.86 The 
fact that abortion was already in the hands of the Scottish medical profession before 
1967, and the fact that the explicit purpose of the 1967 Act was to medicalise the issue 
                                                 
84 Indeed, Gordon makes no mention of the case at all in his chapter on abortion – see G Gordon, Criminal Law, 
(3rd Edition, SULI, 2001) Volume II Chapter 28; in addition, see G. Davis and R. Davidson, “A Fifth Freedom” 
or “Hideous Atheistic Expediency”? The Medical Community and Abortion Law Reform in Scotland, c.1960-
1975, [2006] Medical History 50: 29-48; p.2 
85 For reasons of maternal safety, among other considerations - see Sprang and Neerhoff, Rationale for Banning 
Abortions Late in Pregnancy, [1998] JMA Vol.208, Issue 8 744-747 
86 It may, of course, be argued that the intent behind the amendments to the 1967 Act made by the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 was to restrict the law by lowering the time limit proscribed by s.1(1)(a) 
of the 1967 Act; however one may nevertheless contend that the effectiveness of this attempt was limited by a 
lack of understanding of the unique Scots law – see Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, Volume VII, Criminal Law 
Reissue/9  Abortion and Concealment of Pregnancy, (updated 2014) para.281 
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throughout the whole of Britain,87 suggests that the legal effect 1967 Act has not been 
as great as the practical changes effected by it may appear to suggest. Thus, whatever 
the practical state of the law may be, it must be concluded that the 1967 Act is a 
fundamentally flawed piece of legislation; it takes no account of the unique Scottish 
law, fails to liberalise the law of Scotland, as it had intended, and keeps the subjective 
opinion of individual physicians at the forefront of abortion law. 
Accordingly, as the physician’s opinion remains pertinent to the law as it 
stands,88 it may be suggested that a patient’s request for termination may be handled 
differently according to the individual opinions of the physician that is approached.89 It 
was common for a patient to receive two different responses from two different doctors 
prior to 196790 and, as the 1967 Act merely reflects previous Scottish practice, this may 
remain the case at present. As such, this paper shall presently discuss the issues inherent 
in the pre- and post-1967 Scottish law, assess the likelihood of a patient receiving 
different responses from different doctors’ post-1967 and examine both historic and 
contemporary public and professional opinions concerning the issue of abortion. 
ISSUES INHERENT IN THE LAW 
Though contemporary clinical practice may be regarded as “evidence based”91 and 
decisions relating to medical treatment are generally made based on presented medical 
evidence, rather than a physician’s ethical view,92 there are certainly many areas of 
                                                 
87 Excluding Ireland. 
88 G. Davis and R. Davidson, The Sexual State: Sexuality and Scottish Governance, 1950-1980, (Oxford 
University Press, 2012) Chapter 5 
89 G. Davis, The Great Divide: The Policy and Practice of Abortion in 1960’s Scotland, [2004] The Sibbald 
Library Archives 
90 G. Davis and R. Davidson, “A Fifth Freedom” or “Hideous Atheistic Expediency”? The Medical Community 
and Abortion Law Reform in Scotland, c.1960-1975, [2006] Medical History 50: 29-48; p.45 
91 See Gray, Evidence-based healthcare: how to make health policy and management decisions, (1997, London: 
Churchill Livingstone.) 
92 G. Davis, The Great Divide: The Policy and Practice of Abortion in 1960’s Scotland, [2004] The Sibbald 
Library Archives 
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practice in which a doctor’s moral discretion may be lawfully exercised.93  
The 1967 Act is a prime example of such an occasion as the defence proscribed 
by s.1 of the 1967 Act relies solely on the physician’s opinion and good faith,94 just as 
the pre-1967 common law did.95 The scope afforded by the grounds in Section 196 are 
open to very wide interpretation – one may consider the suggestion that the risks of 
abortion, carried out within the first twelve weeks of gestation, are always less than the 
risks involved in carrying a pregnancy to term.97 
Therefore, it is entirely up to individual medical professionals to determine 
whether or not they are convinced that a termination can be lawfully carried out in any 
situation, not for the courts to inform a course of action.98  
It has been suggested that this medical approach towards regulation of abortion 
poses insurmountable challenges to prosecutors as it is all but impossible to argue that a 
physician’s subjective opinion has been formed in bad faith. This suggestion is 
substantiated by the fact that there remains a dearth of Scottish case law on this matter 
even after 1967: No prosecutions were brought against Scottish doctors between 1945 
and 1966,99 no prosecutions have been recorded, in Scotland, after the 1967 Act came 
into force100 and there remains only one known case in which a Scottish doctor was 
                                                 
93 G. Davis, The Great Divide: The Policy and Practice of Abortion in 1960’s Scotland, [2004] The Sibbald 
Library Archives 
94 Just as the pre-1967 law did 
95 See G Davis and R Davidson, “Big white chief”, “Pontius Pilate” and the “plumber”: the impact of the 1967 
Abortion Act on the Scottish medical community, c.1967–80’, [2005] Soc. Hist. Med., 18: 283–306 
96 Not to mention the common law grounds.  
97 P.H. Tooley, If All Abortions Are Legal, Which Are Desirable?, (1969)The Medical Protection Society, The 
Abortion Act 1967, Proceedings of a Symposium held by The Medical Protection Society in Collaboration with 
the Royal College of General Practitioners, London 7th February 1969 Pitman Publishers p.9 
98 See Jenny Bristow, British Abortion Law: Challenging Current Myths and Misconceptions, [2012] Abortion 
Review  
99 National Archives of Scotland (hereafter NAS), AD63/759/1, House of Commons question, 19 July 1966 
100 G. Davis and R. Davidson, The Sexual State: Sexuality and Scottish Governance, 1950-1980, (Oxford 
University Press, 2012) 
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tried for providing abortion.101  
Another notable issue with the common law position was the fact that, because 
access to abortion was determined by the opinions of individual physicians,102 abortion 
was readily available in some parts of the country, such as Aberdeen,103 yet very 
difficult to obtain in other parts of the country such as Glasgow.104 Given that the 1967 
Act has either restricted or not affected the Scottish legal position, and the 1967 Act 
continues to leave the application of the law in the hands of the medical profession, it is 
submitted that this problem may continue to the present day. Indeed, Gleeson, Forde, 
Bates et al found, in a 2008 study, that 62% of medical students regarded themselves as 
pro-choice.105 This raises the question of what happens when the remaining 38% of 
future doctors come into contact with patients who are seeking therapeutic abortion. 
Prior to 1967, there was a level of deep set hostility towards abortion in 
Glasgow present in both public and professional attitudes. While general public opinion 
towards abortion in the United Kingdom had softened as a result of the thalidomide 
tragedies of 1960’s106 this change was not observed in Glasgow107 and Glasgow 
retained the lowest abortion rate in Scotland.108 
Sir Dugald Baird regarded the presence of a large Roman Catholic minority as 
                                                 
101 G. Davis and R. Davidson, “A Fifth Freedom” or “Hideous Atheistic Expediency”? The Medical Community 
and Abortion Law Reform in Scotland, c.1960-1975, [2006] Medical History 50: 29-48 – As suggested, this case 
may be regarded as an anomaly as the Crown agent noted that the practice adopted by Doctor Ross was more 
akin to that which would be used by a back street abortionist than a respected medical practitioner - NAS, 
AD63/759/2, Note by Crown Agent, Feb. 1967. 
102 G. Davis and R. Davidson, The Sexual State: Sexuality and Scottish Governance, 1950-1980, (Oxford 
University Press, 2012) 
103 Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, Volume VII, Criminal Law Reissue/9  Abortion and Concealment of 
Pregnancy, (updated 2014) 
104 G. Davis and R. Davidson, “A Fifth Freedom” or “Hideous Atheistic Expediency”? The Medical Community 
and Abortion Law Reform in Scotland, c.1960-1975, [2006] Medical History 50: 29-48 
105 Medical Students’ Attitudes Towards Abortion: A U.K Study, (2008) 34 J Med Ethics 783 
106 Daily Mail, 25 July 1962. 
107 G. Davis, The Great Divide: The Policy and Practice of Abortion in 1960’s Scotland, [2004] The Sibbald 
Library Archives 
108 Scotsman, 23 Dec. 1966. 
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the primary factor that contributed to the low availability of abortion in the city. Priests 
would often pay pastoral visits to women in order to dissuade them from their chosen 
course of action109 and, even in 1973, the then-Medical Officer of Health for Glasgow – 
Doctor Thomas Wilson – firmly stated that abortion should be prevented whenever 
possible.110 
Throughout his time in practice, the Glaswegian physician Doctor Ian Donald 
developed the practice of showing women who requested abortion an ultrasound scan 
of the unborn foetus,111 in order to dissuade them.112 This method was routinely 
employed at the Queen Mother’s Hospital113 and it is almost certain that it further 
contributed to the relatively low rate of abortion in the city.114 
It is trite to say that morality does not change overnight and consequently this 
state of affairs did not change until quite some time after the passage of the Abortion 
Act. Indeed, the earliest, and loudest, criticisms of the 1967 Act largely originated from 
the West of Scotland.115  
Glasgow remained so hostile to the 1967 Act that for a number of years after 
1967, a significant number of Scottish women travelled to England in order to procure 
terminations as their own doctors refused to carry out the procedure.116 Recorded 
                                                 
109 G. Davis, The Great Divide: The Policy and Practice of Abortion in 1960’s Scotland, [2004] The Sibbald 
Library Archives 
110 Interview in the Scotsman, 16th January 1973 
111 M. Nicolson, Ian Donald – Diagnostician and Moralist, Online Publication for the University of Glasgow – 
The Sibbald Library 
112 Although current research indicates that women’s reactions to viewing ultrasound images before terminations 
varies considerable (see Katrina Kimport, Ushma Upadhyaya , Diana Foster, Mary Gatter and Tracy A. Weitz, 
Patient viewing of the ultrasound image prior to abortion, [2014] Obstet Gynecol vol.123 81-7), Doctor 
Donald’s intention was clearly to dissuade the women: See M. Nicolson, Ian Donald – Diagnostician and 
Moralist, Online Publication for the University of Glasgow – The Sibbald Library 
113 M. Nicolson, Ian Donald – Diagnostician and Moralist, Online Publication for the University of Glasgow – 
The Sibbald Library 
114 G. Davis and R. Davidson, “A Fifth Freedom” or “Hideous Atheistic Expediency”? The Medical Community 
and Abortion Law Reform in Scotland, c.1960-1975, [2006] Medical History 50: 29-48; p.37 
115 G. Davis and R. Davidson, “A Fifth Freedom” or “Hideous Atheistic Expediency”? The Medical Community 
and Abortion Law Reform in Scotland, c.1960-1975, [2006] Medical History 50: 29-48; p.37 
116 G. Davis and R. Davidson, “A Fifth Freedom” or “Hideous Atheistic Expediency”? The Medical Community 
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figures show that as many as 1,000 women did this in 1972117 and, accordingly, the 
Glasgow-Liverpool train attained the colloquial nickname of ‘the Abortion Express’ at 
the time.118   
It was this strong Catholic influence, and the prevailing negative attitude 
towards abortion which permeated Glaswegian medical practice, that caused Sir Dugald 
to leave the city and relocate to a more liberal location.119 Sir Dugald ultimately chose 
Aberdeen120 as, though the prevailing social conditions of the time were broadly similar 
to those in Glasgow,121 the medical practitioners in this city were not nearly as hostile 
towards the notion of abortion.122  
Faced with similar social problems to those he had encountered in Glasgow,123 
Sir Dugald took advantage of the situation in the city, and the unique Scottish law, to 
adopt and promote a generally permissive policy regarding therapeutic abortion for 
both medical and social reasons.124  As there was only one teaching hospital present in 
the north-east, in contrast to the situation in the West where there were far more, Baird 
was able to comprehensively widen access to abortion in Aberdeen by his introduction 
of liberal policies.125 This influence was so great that, when the 1967 Act was brought 
into force, a number of Aberdonian physicians practically ignored the passage of the 
                                                                                                                                                        
and Abortion Law Reform in Scotland, c.1960-1975, [2006] Medical History 50: 29-48; p.45 
117 H Homans, The Sexual Politics of Reproduction, (1985, Aldershot, Gower) pp.84-85 
118 G. Davis and R. Davidson, “A Fifth Freedom” or “Hideous Atheistic Expediency”? The Medical Community 
and Abortion Law Reform in Scotland, c.1960-1975, [2006] Medical History 50: 29-48; p.46 
119 Wellcome, SA/ALR/C.115, Note by Sir Dugald Baird 
120 G. Davis and R. Davidson, “A Fifth Freedom” or “Hideous Atheistic Expediency”? The Medical Community 
and Abortion Law Reform in Scotland, c.1960-1975, [2006] Medical History 50: 29-48 
121 G. Davis and R. Davidson, “A Fifth Freedom” or “Hideous Atheistic Expediency”? The Medical Community 
and Abortion Law Reform in Scotland, c.1960-1975, [2006] Medical History 50: 29-48; p.37 
122 G. Davis, The Great Divide: The Policy and Practice of Abortion in 1960’s Scotland, [2004] The Sibbald 
Library Archives 
123 G. Davis, The Great Divide: The Policy and Practice of Abortion in 1960’s Scotland, [2004] The Sibbald 
Library Archives 
124 G. Davis and R. Davidson, “A Fifth Freedom” or “Hideous Atheistic Expediency”? The Medical Community 
and Abortion Law Reform in Scotland, c.1960-1975, [2006] Medical History 50: 29-48 
125 See D Baird, An area maternity service, Lancet, 1969, i: 515–19, p. 516. 
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Act, as its provisions already reflected their professional medical practice.126 
On his arrival in the city, Sir Dugald had sought and gained the advice of 
Professor Thomas Smith127 regarding the Scottish legal position on abortion. Professor 
Smith provided an assurance that the act was lawful in Scotland, so long as it was 
carried out in a proper medical environment.128 This advice was given with the support 
of the local police, who regarded their sole concern in relation to the issue as being the 
prevention of abortion carried out with “criminal intent”.129  
As such, it is submitted that the medical professions’ understanding130 of the law 
determined the availability of lawful abortion throughout Scotland. Before the 1967 Act 
was passed, the Scottish medical profession, generally, presumed that the English law 
regarding abortion applied to Scotland131 and, as the prosecution of an English doctor 
for abortion would be “open and shut” in any situation that was not analogous to the 
Bourne case,132 it may therefore be argued that this lack of understanding significantly 
contributed to the pre-1967 probability of receiving different answers from different 
doctors, as the majority of Scottish physicians of the time were simply not aware of the 
true legal position.133 
Though there may be some merit in this argument, however, and the number of 
                                                 
126 The Observer, 30th January 1966 
127 Dean of the Faculty of Law at Aberdeen University  
128 G Bhatia, ‘Social obstetrics, maternal health care policies and reproductive rights: the role of Dugald Baird 
in Great Britain, 1937–65’, MPhil thesis, University of Oxford, 1996, p. 59 
129 See comments made by Chief Constable William Smith in an interview with the Turiff and District 
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132 Bourne itself was an anomaly; a case which held little legal weight, but was granted legitimacy through 
common practice: British Medical Association, Report of Committee on Medical Aspects of Abortion, (1936) 
para.19 
133G. Davis, The Great Divide: The Policy and Practice of Abortion in 1960’s Scotland, [2004] The Sibbald 
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lawfully obtained terminations did increase in the wake of the 1967 Act,134 numerous 
sources indicate that access to abortion remained a geographical lottery,135 dependent 
on one’s doctor and location, even after the legislation was passed.136 The fact that the 
number of lawful terminations carried out increased after the passage of the Act can be 
ascribed to the publicity that the Act enjoyed and the public perception that it was an 
Act that would ‘legalise’ abortion.137 It is submitted that Scottish women could obtain 
lawful abortions prior to 1967 under the common law, had they known that they could 
request them. Whether they or not the physician acceded to their request would depend 
upon that doctor’s own personal opinions and prejudices, but the possibility of attaining 
a lawful abortion was present and distinct even prior to the passage of the Act.  
Furthermore, it may be concluded that the Act does not negate the possibility of 
severe geographic inconsistencies in access to abortion arising as individual medical 
professionals’ still control practical access to abortion, just as they did according to the 
pre-1967 Scottish common law. As the present legal position, throughout Scotland, 
England and Wales, so closely resembles the pre-1967 Scottish position, it is submitted 
that the problems that were present under that regime remain inherent in the law today.   
It is further submitted that an increased public and professional awareness of 
legal abortion, combined with the liberalisation of social attitudes,138 did more to 
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increase the availability of terminations than any mechanical change in the law. 
Alternatively, or perhaps additionally, one may suggest that the availability of abortion 
increased because, as some in the profession feared,139 fewer doctors with negative 
attitudes towards abortion have entered the field of gynaecology since the passage of 
this Act. There is not, however, any real reliable evidence to support this assertion140 
due to a lack of impartial commentary resulting from the controversy surrounding the 
issue.141  While the conscience clause, introduced by s.4 of the Act, is not perfect,142 
there is no doubt that the concept is a welcome addition to the law which may protect 
the interests of the conscientious professionals.  
Ultimately, it is clear that the 1967 Act is a flawed piece of legislation within the 
Scottish context and it is evident that even if the legislation had a restrictive effect on 
Scots law, the legislation was ineffective in the practical context as physicians retained 
all of the power that they already had.143  
With these flaws in mind, this paper shall presently consider why the 1967 Act 
took the form that it did, critically examine the reasons why Scotland was included in 
the Act’s provisions, in spite of the already-liberal law and seek to determine if the 
allegations that the 1967 Act is an overly Anglo-centric piece of legislation144 are well-
founded. 
                                                 
139 National Archives Scotland, HH102/1232, Professor E McGirr, University of Glasgow, to Miss M 
Macdonald, SHHD, 1974. 
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(see, particularly, Jacky Engel, Abortion Law Reform, 2004 CMF) which, again, paint a coloured picture of the 
issue. 
142 See – Social Services Committee, Abortion Act 1967 ‘Conscience Clause’, (10th Report, 1990) 
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144 See NAS, AD63/759/2, D Cowperthwaite to R Lawrie, 2 Oct. 1967 
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THE 1967 ACT – ANGLO-CENTRIC LEGISLATION? 
Though the 1967 Act was introduced to Parliament by a Scottish MP,145 it is clear that 
the legislation was not drafted with the intricacies of Scots law in mind.146 The Act is 
overly reliant on English statute147 and – in spite of the liberal intentions of the 
legislature – the Act has either been restrictive or ineffective in Scotland.148  
This state of affairs appears to have led contemporary politicians to falsely 
assume that the legislation has had the same effect both in Scotland and in England.149 
Accordingly, one may assert that the 1967 Act is the result of Westminster legislating 
for Scotland with an Anglo-centric view. 
In order to determine the validity of this claim, it is necessary to consider the 
manner in which the Act was drafted and the background to the legislation itself: The 
1967 Act was introduced as a private members bill, in 1966,150 by David Steel MP and 
its introduction was supported by the government of the day.151 Three previous attempts 
to introduce similar bills failed between 1951 and 1965.152  
Due to governmental support, a joint British Medical Association-Royal College 
of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists committee was formed and Sir John Peel was 
appointed to the chair of a medical advisory committee in charge of analysing the 
relevant social, medical and moral issues surrounding the 1966 Bill.153 It is notable that 
Sir John was a noted opponent of abortion law reform,154 though the committee 
                                                 
145 David Steel MP – see Kandiah and Staerck, The Abortion Act 1967, (2002, Institute of British History) 
146 Social Services Committee, Abortion Act 1967 ‘Conscience Clause’, (10th Report, 1990) 
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nevertheless came out in support of the Bill.155  
When introducing the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Bill 1966,156 Mr Steel 
regarded a discussion he had engaged in with Sir Dugald Baird157 as more influential 
than similar dialogues with government ministers, religious groups and the Abortion 
Law Reform Association (ALRA).158 It was Sir Dugald’s input which caused Mr Steel 
to consider the introduction of a ‘social’ clause which was not distinctly separated from 
medical concerns;159 however, as the BMA, and many others in the medical profession, 
strongly opposed the introduction of this provision, Steel was ultimately forced to 
remove it from the Bill.160 ‘Social’ abortions became regarded as legally permissible in 
England and Wales (as asserted, they were already lawful in Scotland161) due to the 
interpretation, by some doctors, of ‘health’ as referring to a “state of physical, mental 
and social162 wellbeing”.163 
Given that the 1966 Bill was introduced by a Scottish MP who was heavily 
influenced by a Scottish doctor – not just any Scottish doctor, but one who, even more 
than most, was acutely aware of the more liberal Scottish law – one may wonder 
exactly how the 1967 Act may be regarded as Anglo-centric. Indeed these factors, 
combined with the fact that some of the notable problems in the drafting of the Act, 
such as the possibility of a woman receiving different answers from different doctors, 
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appear to affect England and Wales as well as Scotland,164 suggest that the 1967 Act 
was not passed with an overly Anglo-centric view. 
Further supporting this is the fact that it was Sir Dugald himself who 
encouraged Steel to extend the provision of the Act to Scotland, in spite of the more 
liberal Scottish law165 and his own personal frustration that legislation was seen as 
necessary at all.166 Sir Dugald convinced Steel that the protections of the Act should 
apply to Scotland as, while the Scottish law was easier to understand,167 Sir Dugald 
himself was “the only one taking advantage of it”.168 As such, the historic context and 
the attitude taken by the progenitors of the 1966 Bill would appear to suggest that it is 
too easy to label the 1967 Act as purely Anglo-centric. 
With that said however, there is evidence to suggest that the attitudes of the 
English draftsmen at the time are indicative of a lack of concern for the unique Scottish 
law.169 Indeed, soon after the passage of the 1967 Act, the Assistant Secretary of the 
SHHD expressed his dissatisfaction with the parliamentary draftsmen who framed the 
legislation by criticising, what he viewed as, a blatant disregard of the ‘previous’ 
Scottish legal position.170  
The Assistant Secretary stated that the general unwillingness of English 
departments to alter drafts which met English requirements, but not Scottish needs, was 
such that problems would be, and later were, caused for the Scots.171 Most notable 
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among these problems is the fact that the time limit which the legislation sought to 
introduce was initially absolutely inapplicable in Scotland,172 due to the fact that the 
Infant Life Preservation Act 1929, which the 1967 Act expressly relied upon to 
determine the concept of ‘viability’ prior to the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Act 1990,173 extends to England and Wales only.174  
For these reasons it is clear to see why there were attempts to exclude Scotland 
from the provisions of the Act175 and why one may be tempted to say that the 1967 Act 
was passed with an Anglo-centric view. However, on balance it would appear that while 
the Act may have been drafted in a manner which catered more towards the codified 
English law, it was not passed in Parliament without due consideration for the unique 
Scottish law.176 While, with the benefit of hindsight, one may suggest that it would have 
been best to tackle the issue of abortion in Scotland, England and Wales with separate 
pieces of legislation, this suggestion is wholly impractical; it is, ultimately, fortunate 
that even one Abortion Act passed through Parliament at the time; trying to pass a 
second Act simultaneously would be tempting fate.177 Indeed, between 1968 and 1989, 
the pro-life lobby made sixteen attempts to alter or repeal the 1967 Act.178 
With that said, as the 1967 Act has widely been regarded as a success, but is 
wholly flawed within the Scottish context, one must consider why the Act has not been 
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amended to better reflect Scots law, especially in light of the Scotland Act 1998179 and 
the creation of the Scottish Parliament. 
This question raises the ultimate issue concerning abortion law in Scotland: The 
ability to legislate on the issue is reserved to Westminster,180 despite the fact that 
abortion is a medico-criminal matter and issues of healthcare and the criminal law are 
devolved to Holyrood.181 It is therefore small wonder that the perception of a unified 
Scottish, English and Welsh abortion law has developed and been perpetuated; although 
the legislators that created and framed the 1967 Act were clearly aware that the 
different countries within the United Kingdom had different needs in relation to 
abortion, as the Act was not extended to Northern Ireland,182 they nevertheless chose to 
frame the law in such a way that addressed the needs of English and Welsh law, but 
caused problems for the Scots.183  
Accordingly, one may conclude that, while the 1967 Act is not an Anglo-centric piece 
of legislation,184 the Parliamentary draftsmen that composed the Act clearly took no 
account of the unique Scottish law.185 The fact that the UK Parliament has reserved its 
right to legislate on this matter is illogical and therefore problematic. This approach 
takes no account of the subtle, and not so subtle, differences between Scottish and 
English law and is blatantly out of step with the rest of the Scotland Act; as such, it is 
submitted that, as the 2014 Independence referendum resulted in a ‘No’ vote,186 with 
                                                 
179 c.46 
180 See part II, Head J of the Scotland Act 1998 
181 See D. Stockley, The increasingly strange case of abortion: Scots criminal law and devolution, [1998] Edin. 
L.R. Volume 2, 330-337 
182 Abortion Act 1967, s.7 
183 NAS, AD63/759/2, D Cowperthwaite to R Lawrie, 2 Oct. 1967 
184 NAS, AD63/759/2, D Cowperthwaite to R Lawrie, 2 Oct. 1967 
185 D. Stockley, The increasingly strange case of abortion: Scots criminal law and devolution, [1998] Edin. L.R. 
Volume 2, 330-337 
186 See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-29270441 
P a g e  | 28 
 
the promise of new powers for the Scottish Parliament,187 the issue of abortion should 
be devolved to Holyrood in order to ensure that any legislative review of the topic is 
given thorough legal consideration that takes into account the nuances of Scots law. 
CONCLUSION 
After a detailed consideration of relevant case law and statute it is clear that the 1967 
Act is a flawed piece of legislation within the Scottish context. The gradual 
liberalisation of ethical opinions concerning abortion has done more to widen access to 
safe abortion than the ‘changes’ made to the law by the Act; indeed, even in spite of 
recent comments made by the Inner House, one may doubt that any mechanical 
changes were actually brought about by the Act at all. 
It remains distinctly possible for different women to receive different answers 
dependent on which physician they approach with their request and, from that point of 
view, whether or not the 1967 Act was legally restrictive or ineffective is moot: The 
tenets of the pre-1967 Scottish common law are codified by statute and accordingly the 
practical problems of the common law position are brought to bear.  
 Although it is evident that the 1967 Act was not passed with an overly Anglo-
centric view, the fact that Westminster has reserved the right to legislate on abortion is 
both curious and illogical. Consequently, it is clear that the Scottish Parliament should 
be given control of this area of law, particularly as it already lies within the remit of two 
devolved areas – criminal law and healthcare. 
With all of this in mind, however, one must ultimately consider the comments 
made by Mr Geoffrey Howe QC shortly after the Act was passed. In a 1969 article, Mr 
Howe plainly stated that the 1967 Act would only ever be altered if public opinion 
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turned solidly against it.188 As public opinion towards abortion has only softened in the 
decades since, and the legislation has remained all but unchanged in spite of numerous 
flaws, one may conclude that he was right. 
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